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Shapeshifting Securities
By Wendy Gerwick Couture*
This essay demonstrates that, because of the ﬂexible deﬁnition
of “security,” certain interests have the potential to fall in and out
of the deﬁnition, and thus in and out of securities regulation.
This essay coins this potentiality “shapeshifting.” The phenomenon of shapeshifting securities can affect the regulation of
interests in traditional business entities, like partnerships and
limited liability companies, as well as newer asset types, like
digital coins and tokens.
In particular, this essay identiﬁes two scenarios in which securities might shapeshift. Under the ﬁrst scenario, an economically
identical interest is sold to multiple owners. Yet, because of different personal attributes of the owners or a differential allocation of power among the owners, the interest is a security in the
hands of some but not others. Under the second scenario, an
interest’s classiﬁcation as a security changes over time—depending on personal attributes of the owners, the owners’ degree of
control, or the importance of others’ efforts in the success of the
venture. Thus, at some points in its lifecycle, an interest is a security; and, at other points, it is not.
And yet, securities regulation—including issuer exemptions,
resale exemptions, and regulation of trading platforms—is
premised on the assumption that securities do not shapeshift. In
other words, securities regulation assumes that an identical interest in the hands of different owners is either a security for all or
a security for none and that, if an interest is within the scope of
the securities laws, it stays there from issuance through resale
and trading. This essay explores this tension.
I. Potential for Shapeshifting Securities
In order for an interest to be governed by the securities laws, it
must fall within the deﬁnition of “security.” This deﬁnition
includes a laundry list of speciﬁc interests, such as stock and
notes, as well as the catch-all category of “investment contracts.”1
As interpreted by the Supreme Court in S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey
Co. and its progeny, an interest qualiﬁes as an investment
contract if the following elements are present (unless the context
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otherwise requires):2 (1) the investment of money (2) in a common enterprise (3) with the expectation of proﬁts (4) derived primarily from the efforts of others.3 “The touchstone is the presence
of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable
expectation of proﬁts to be derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others.”4 This ﬂexible test seeks to capture
“the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek
the use of the money of others on the promise of proﬁts.”5
The “efforts of others” element focuses on whether the “efforts
made by those other than the investor are undeniably signiﬁcant
ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure
or success of the enterprise.”6 This interpretation prevents a wily
issuer from evading the securities laws “by adding a requirement
that the buyer contribute a modicum of effort.”7 This analysis
focuses on how the business actually operates, considering the allocation of power both in the governing documents and in
practice.8 This element gives rise to the potential for shapeshifting securities.
First, the “efforts of others” element can depend on an owner’s
personal attributes. If an owner is “so inexperienced and
unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers,”9 then the
element may be satisﬁed.10 For example, partnership interests in
a wireless cable television system were securities where “investors were targeted for their ignorance of law, accounting, and the
wireless cable television industry.”11
Yet, owners’ personal attributes are neither uniform nor
immutable. One owner might be knowledgeable and experienced,
while another might not. One owner might evolve, becoming more
knowledgeable and experienced over time. Upon resale of an
interest, the new owner might possess a different degree of knowledge and experience than the prior.
Second, the “efforts of others” element depends on an owner’s
degree of control.12 If a partnership or operating agreement
“leaves so little power in the hands of the partner or venturer
that the arrangement in fact distributes power as would a limited
partnership,” then the interest may be a security.13 If interests
are sold to “large numbers of the general public,” then each
owner’s power may be “diluted to the level of a single shareholder
in a corporation,” thus supporting application of the securities
laws.14 If the owners are “geographically dispersed, with no
preexisting relationships,”15 then it may prevent them from effectively exercising power. The owners’ “pseudonymity” may
render it “difﬁcult for them to join together to effect change or to
exercise meaningful control.”16
Yet, owners’ degrees of control are neither uniform nor
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constant.17 One owner might have greater power than another,
based on the allocation of control in governing documents or on
the percentage of ownership. Governing documents, such as
partnership or operating agreements, might be amended to
provide owners more or less power over time. Likewise, as securities change hands, power might be consolidated or diluted, and
pseudonymity might be gained or lost.
Third, the “efforts of others” element requires that others’ efforts be managerial rather than ministerial.18 For example, where
a company “offered silver bars for sale and, by high-pressure
sales efforts, touted bar silver as a superior investment” but “the
proﬁts to the investor depended upon the ﬂuctuations of the silver
market, not the managerial efforts of [the company],” no investment contract was created.19 Similarly, where the promoter of
investments in viatical settlements identiﬁed the settlements to
purchase and retained record ownership thereof but the investors’ rate of return depended almost exclusively on “how long the
insured survives,” the interests were not investment contracts.20
Yet, others’ efforts might be managerial at some points and
ministerial at others. For example, as explained by William Hinman, the Director of the S.E.C. Division of Corporation Finance,
a digital asset (like a coin or token) might be a security at the
time of issuance but then fall out of the deﬁnition once the
network is sufﬁciently decentralized:
But this also points the way to when a digital asset transaction
may no longer represent a security offering. If the network on which
the token or coin is to function is sufﬁciently decentralized-where
purchasers would no longer reasonably expect a person or group to
carry out essential managerial or entrepreneurial efforts-the assets
may not represent an investment contract. Moreover, when the efforts of the third party are no longer a key factor for determining
the enterprise’s success, material information asymmetries recede.
As a network becomes truly decentralized, the ability to identify an
issuer or promoter to make the requisite disclosures becomes difﬁcult, and less meaningful.21

Accordingly, Director Hinman expressed the view that applying
the securities laws to trading on the Bitcoin and Ethereum
networks “would seem to add little value” because those networks
are sufﬁciently decentralized.22 The S.E.C. Staff for the Strategic
Hub for Innovation and Financial Technology has likewise
recognized that digital assets might be sold as securities but
later fall out of the deﬁnition,23 depending on the continued role
of a third party “active participant” (“AP”) like a promoter or
sponsor. According to the Staff, key factors include whether “the
efforts of an AP, including any successor AP, continue to be
important to the value of an investment in a digital asset,”
whether “the network on which the digital asset is to function
© 2020 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E
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operates in such a manner that purchasers would no longer reasonably expect an AP to carry out essential managerial or
entrepreneurial efforts,” and whether “the efforts of an AP are no
longer affecting the enterprise’s success.”24
Moreover, as has been recognized by Professor James J. Park,
a network might be decentralized at one point and then revert to
being centralized, thus bringing the securities laws back into
play:
Another observation that should be made is that while a token like
Ether could cease to become a security, it could also fall back into
security status in certain circumstances. Suppose a single individual gains control of more than half of the Ethereum network’s
processing power and could thus essentially control the platform. If
that happened, it would be likely that the success of the platform
would depend upon the decisions made by that individual.25

Finally, as recognized by Professors Jonathan Rohr and Aaron
Wright, as applied to digital assets like “utility tokens,”26 the
stage of development is relevant: “The timing of the sale in relation to functionality (that is, when the token can actually be used
for something) is relevant insofar as a token sale that takes place
far in advance of anticipated functionality is more likely to be a
security because token holders are reliant upon the efforts of the
development team for the project to ever reach the point at which
the service, platform, or network can actually be used.”27 At a
later point in the interest’s life cycle, however, such as when a
utility token is fully functional, the owners may not longer be
reliant on the efforts of others. Thus, as others’ efforts shift between managerial and ministerial, an interest might fall in or
out of the securities laws.
II. Securities Regulation’s Assumption That Securities
Do Not Shapeshift
Because the “efforts of others” element is neither uniform nor
immutable, securities can shapeshift. At one moment in time, an
interest might be a security in the hands of some owners but not
others. Over time, an interest might fall in or out of the deﬁnition.
Yet, the securities laws—including issuer exemptions, resale
exemptions, and regulation of trading platforms—assume that
status as a security is both uniform and constant.
A. Issuer Exemptions
Upon issuance, if an interest is a security, it cannot be offered
or sold unless it is registered with the S.E.C. or exempt from
registration.28 Although there are myriad issuer exemptions, at
their core, each attempts to exempt from the registration requirement “securities transactions where there is no practical need for
its application or where the public beneﬁts are too remote.”29 In
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order to achieve this, issuer exemptions sometimes restrict the
status of investors, cap the number of investors to whom a security can be sold, limit the aggregate offering price, or restrict the
residency of purchasers. Yet, each of these restrictions is premised
on the notion that all of the interests offered or sold in a particular offering are securities, regardless of the personal attributes
of, or degree of control exercised by, the purchasers.
Some issuer exemptions require that all purchasers qualify as
“accredited”30 or limit the number of nonaccredited purchasers.31
The rationale is to limit these exempt offerings to “those persons
whose ﬁnancial sophistication and ability to sustain the risk of
loss of investment or fend for themselves render the protections
of the Securities Act’s registration process unnecessary.”32 The
S.E.C. recently expanded the deﬁnition of “accredited investor” to
include, not only various institutional investors and individuals
meeting certain net worth or income requirements, but also
individuals “holding in good standing one or more professional
certiﬁcations or designations or credentials from an accredited
educational institution that the Commission has designated.”33
Yet, even post-amendment, it is conceivable for a nonaccredited
investor to possess a sufﬁcient degree of knowledge, experience,
and control over the venture to exempt the interests sold to that
investor from the securities laws. For example, an individual investor might not satisfy the net worth, income, or education
requirements and yet nonetheless be sufﬁciently involved in
managing the business that he or she is not relying primarily on
the efforts of others. In that circumstance, if an issuer exemption
requires all purchasers to be accredited, should sale of nonsecurity interests to this nonaccredited investor destroy the
exemption? If an issuer exemption limits the number of nonaccredited purchasers, should the nonaccredited investor to whom
non-security interests are sold count toward that limit?
Some issuer exemptions, like Rule 50434 and Regulation CF,35
include a cap on the aggregate offering price of securities sold
pursuant to an exemption. Rule 504 is intended to be a “clear
and workable exemption for small offerings by small issuers;”36
similarly, Regulation CF is “intended to help provide startups
and small businesses with capital by making relatively low dollar
offerings of securities, featuring relatively low dollar investments
by the ‘crowd,’ less costly.”37 Yet, it is possible that interests sold
to a particular investor in an offering might not qualify as securities, although interests sold to other investors in the same offering do so qualify. In that circumstance, should the amount raised
from the sale of the non-security interests be included when
calculating the aggregate offering price?
Some issuer exemptions, like Rules 14738 and 147A,39 require
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that all purchasers reside in a particular state. These instrastate
offering exemptions are intended to defer to states’ “ﬂexibility to
adopt requirements that are consistent with their respective
interests in facilitating capital formation and protecting their
resident investors.”40 Yet, it conceivable that the interests sold to
a particular nonresident do not qualify as securities. In that scenario, should the sale of the non-security interests to the nonresident destroy the exemption?
B. Resale Exemptions
Post-issuance, if an interest is a security, it cannot be resold
unless it is registered with the S.E.C. or exempt from
registration. 41 Resale exemptions often dovetail with issuer
exemptions, premised on the assumption that an interest is a security at both the time of issuance and the time of resale. In addition, like issuer exemptions, resale exemptions assume that all
resold interests are securities, regardless of the personal attributes of, or degree of control exercised by, the purchasers.
For example, the Rule 144 resale exemption depends on the
status of the reseller as an “afﬁliate” or as a “non-afﬁliate” and
the status of the securities to be resold as “restricted” or
“unrestricted.”42 “The purpose of Rule 144 is to provide objective
criteria for determining that the person selling securities to the
public has not acquired the securities from the issuer for
distribution.”43 It is conceivable that a reseller might possess sufﬁcient knowledge, experience, and control that the interest is not
a security in his or her hands, but the purchaser(s) might not,
thus resulting in the acquisition of securities. In that scenario,
the reseller would likely qualify as an “afﬁliate” of the issuer due
to his or her control.44 However, the interests to be sold would
likely not qualify as “restricted securities” because they are not
securities in the hands of the reseller.45 Accordingly, should the
resale satisfy the Rule 144 exemption even if only the less onerous requirements for “unrestricted” securities are met, including
the absence of a holding period?
In addition, some resale exemptions, like Section 4(a)(7),
require that all purchasers qualify as “accredited.”46 Yet, as in the
context of issuer exemptions, it is possible that some purchasers,
albeit nonaccredited, might possess the degree of knowledge, experience, and control to render their purchased interests nonsecurities. In that context, should the sale of the non-security
interests to those nonaccredited investors destroy the resale
exemption?
C. Regulation of Trading Platforms
It is unlawful for an exchange to effect any securities transaction unless the exchange is registered with the S.E.C. or exempt
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from registration.47 “Exchange” is broadly deﬁned to include “any
organization, association, or group of persons” that “constitutes,
maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for bringing
together purchasers and sellers of securities.”48 As explained by
the S.E.C., the “regulation of markets should both accommodate
traditional market structures and provide sufﬁcient ﬂexibility to
ensure that new markets promote fairness, efﬁciency, and
transparency.” 49 By deﬁnition, if the interests traded on a
platform do not qualify as securities, then the platform is not an
exchange within the ambit of the securities laws. 50 And, as
recognized by Director Hinman, it is conceivable for interests to
be securities when issued but not during later trading, such as
digital assets that have become sufﬁciently decentralized.
And yet, there is insufﬁcient guidance about that tipping point.
When enforcing Section 5 of the Securities Act and Section 5 of
the Exchange Act in the context of digital assets, the S.E.C. has
often conﬂated status as a security upon issuance and status as a
security in later trading.51 Indeed, for this reason, Professor
Kristin L. Johnson has critiqued the S.E.C.’s Cease-and-Desist
Order against Zachary Coburn based on his role establishing
EtherDelta for the trading of ERC20 tokens:
Without a clear explanation regarding the attributes of the tokens
that establish that they are securities, it is not clear speciﬁcally
which tokens Coburn should have assumed were securities that
triggered liability under Section 5 of the Securities Act. While the
discussion of the application of Section 5 of the Securities Act is
weak and muddled, the discussion regarding the application of Section 5 of the Exchange Act is almost entirely absent.52

Accordingly, scholars, including Professor Johnson, have
recognized the need to “create new rules that recognize the
distinctions between centralized and decentralized exchanges
and distinguish these types of exchanges from traditional securities and commodities exchanges.”53
III. A Path Forward
The potential for shapeshifting securities, in the context of
both traditional business entities and innovative digital assets,
should inspire a reexamination of the scope of securities regulation and the assumptions underlying it. Just as the deﬁnition of
“security” is ﬂexible in recognition that “substance must govern
over form,”54 so too should the regulation of offerings, resales, and
trading platforms. Each of these regulatory schemes should
explicitly account for the potential for interests to be securities in
the hands of some investors and not others and for interests to be
securities at some, but not all, stages in their lifecycle. Only then
can securities regulation achieve its tripartite goal of furthering
investor protection, capital formation, and market efﬁciency.
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